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An “Insurmountable Hurdle” to Class Action Certification?
The Heightened Ascertainability Requirement’s Effect on
Small Consumer Claims*

INTRODUCTION
In 2009, Direct Digital, LLC, a manufacturer of nutritional
supplements, released Instaflex, a “revolutionary” formula that was
intended to relieve joint pain.1 The company advertised that the
product was “scientifically formulated” to “relieve discomfort,”
“improve flexibility,” “increase mobility,” and “support cartilage
repair.”2 One bottle of Instaflex Joint Support containing ninety pills
costs $69.99—a small price to pay for the promised benefits.3
Consumers who planned on taking multiple pills daily as
recommended likely bought multiple bottles.4 Given the frequency of
those purchases, as well as the fact that the bottles themselves are
relatively inexpensive, it is also likely that few consumers kept
receipts proving when and where they bought Instaflex.5 There was
also no evidence that retailers selling Instaflex kept records of who
purchased it on any given date.6
This lack of recordkeeping did not seem problematic until the
truth behind the pills was revealed. Despite Direct Digital’s grand
claims of the supplement’s health benefits, Instaflex’s primary active
ingredient is glucosamine sulfate, meaning the pill contains little more
than sugar.7 Consumers expecting to purchase a nutritional
* © 2016 Sarah R. Cansler.
1. Instaflex Advanced, INSTAFLEX, http://www.instaflex.com/products/joint [http://perma
.cc/2PRN-4X6Q]; see Instaflex® Joint Support Featured On ‘The Doctors’ Television
Program, PRWEB, http://www.prweb.com/releases/Instaflex/Doctors/prweb11355816.htm
[http://perma.cc/F9A7-KVUM] (displaying a Nov. 21, 2013, Instaflex press release).
2. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting statements
from Instaflex labels and marketing materials), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
3. See INSTAFLEX, supra note 1.
4. See id. (recommending a dose of three pills a day for four weeks to begin to
achieve “significant relief”); cf. Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for
Class Certification at 5–6, Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-01829 (N.D. Ill. May
27, 2014), 2014 WL 10337752 (quoting class member’s sworn declaration documenting his
daily use of Instaflex).
5. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661.
6. See id.
7. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at
*2–3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014).

94 N.C. L. REV. 1382 (2016)

2016]

HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY

1383

supplement that would relieve their joint pain instead received a
placebo, making it highly unlikely that Instaflex could live up to its
billing.8
One Instaflex purchaser, Vincent Mullins, felt that the product
was “phony” and fraudulently advertised.9 But like many other
Instaflex purchasers, he had no proof that he had purchased or used
Instaflex.10 He brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois seeking a refund and to impose appropriate fines
on Direct Digital, to compensate Instaflex purchasers for allegedly
fraudulent marketing.11 Because the value of his claim was small
compared to the cost of litigating the suit by himself, Mullins needed
to certify a class to successfully pursue his claim.12 Courts have
established two approaches to class certification—exemplified by
decisions from the Third and Seventh Circuits—which would each
result in radically different outcomes for Mullins’s suit.
Under the first rule, created by the Third Circuit and since
adopted by several other circuits, Mullins would not have been able
to certify a class unless potential members could show objective proof
of their Instaflex purchases.13 Heightened ascertainability requires
that the class representative define proposed classes based on
objective criteria and that plaintiffs demonstrate a “reliable and
administratively feasible” means of determining class membership.14
Proposed classes that lack objective evidence to prove membership,

8. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658.
9. Mullins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *1, *7.
10. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 4, at 1. Mullins claims he purchased Instaflex at a GNC with cash, did not keep
his receipt, and threw the bottle away less than two weeks later. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 5–7, Direct Dig., LLC v. Mullins, 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (No. 15-549).
11. Mullins, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *7–8.
12. See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities
Theory of the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 709 (2006) (discussing
how the plaintiffs in a large class action suit likely would not have been able to litigate
their small claims without the class action device).
13. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015) (“[A]
class is not ascertainable unless the class definition contains objective criteria that allow
for class members to be identified in an administratively feasible way.”); Byrd v. Aaron’s
Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 163–64 (3d Cir. 2015) (describing the history of the heightened
ascertainability requirement in the circuit); Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp.
2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“Without an objective, reliable way to ascertain class
membership, the class quickly would become unmanageable . . . .”); Weiner v. Snapple
Beverage Corp., 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79647, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
3, 2010) (“A class is ascertainable when defined by objective criteria that are
administratively feasible . . . .”).
14. Byrd, 784 F.3d at 163.
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such as business records or receipts, often fail under the heightened
ascertainability requirement.
Alternatively, some courts, including the Seventh Circuit, have
followed a different approach.15 Fearing that the heightened
ascertainability requirement would make it unduly difficult to certify
certain types of class actions—effectively destroying entire categories
of claims—the Seventh Circuit flatly rejected it.16 Instead, the court
relied on its own “weak” definition of “ascertainability,” holding that
the inquiry should revolve around the adequacy of the class definition
itself, not any potential difficulty in identifying individual class
members.17 Under this standard, potential class definitions should be
screened only for vagueness, objectivity, and whether the class is
defined in terms of success on the merits.18 Consequently, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the certification of Mullins’s proposed class.19
The Seventh Circuit’s decision created a circuit split, inviting the
Supreme Court to settle these competing interpretations of
“ascertainability.” However, the Court denied certiorari in Mullins
and allowed the Seventh Circuit’s decision to stand. The decision to
deny review may have more to do with internal Supreme Court
politics in the wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s death than the merits
of the case.20 Nonetheless, the denial comes as something of a
surprise. Prior to Mullins, the Court’s recent class action certification
decisions suggest support for the Third Circuit’s heightened
ascertainability requirement. Those decisions emphasize that class
certification requires a close investigation into whether a proposed
class meets the requirements for certification and whether the
relevant claims can be litigated effectively and efficiently as a class

15. See, e.g., Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 524–27 (6th Cir. 2015);
Mullins v. Direct Dig., 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016). Both the Seventh and Third Circuits refer to the requirement of a “ ‘reliable and
administratively feasible’ way” to identify class members as the “heightened
ascertainability requirement.” See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657; Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d
154, 172 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring). This Recent Development adopts the
same language.
16. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58.
17. Id. at 659.
18. Id. at 659–60.
19. Id. at 674.
20. See Amanda Bronstad, To Defense Bar’s Dismay, SCOTUS Rejects Review of Class
Action, NAT’L L.J. (Mar. 2, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202751230219/ToDefense-Bars-Dismay-SCOTUS-Rejects-Review-of-Class-Action?slreturn=20160208195552
[http://perma.cc/SA74-DX7Y] (noting that Justice Scalia “authored some of the Supreme
Court’s most pivotal class action cases” and that his death leaves the Court’s conservative
wing without a “clear path to five votes . . . .”).
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action.21 The Court has written that a class action must be
“maintainable” to achieve class certification and that proposed class
definitions require a “close look” to ensure that a class action is the
most appropriate form in which to bring the claim in question.22 More
recently, the Court held that class certification was only appropriate
after a “rigorous analysis” of the requirements for certification,
providing implicit support for a strict certification requirement like
heightened
ascertainability.23
Consequently,
this
Recent
Development argues that the Supreme Court should resolve the split
between the Third and Seventh Circuits by adopting the heightened
ascertainability requirement. This rule serves as a useful tool for
ensuring that class actions function efficiently and successfully, a
concern that even the Seventh Circuit recognizes is crucial to the class
action device.24
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly discusses how the
class action device has developed in recent decades, allowing
heightened ascertainability to gain a foothold as a certification
requirement. Part II provides the factual context for the Seventh
Circuit’s rejection of the requirement. Part III then analyzes why the
heightened ascertainability requirement effectively addresses the
policy concerns surrounding class actions. Finally, Part IV considers
the issues that the heightened ascertainability requirement leaves
open and evaluates how the Supreme Court should interpret the rule
to balance the efficiency of class actions with the need to certify
certain types of class actions.
21. See Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (emphasizing that
certification is only appropriate when a court is satisfied after “rigorous analysis” that all
of the prerequisites for certification have been satisfied); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011) (“[Class action] claims must depend upon a common
contention . . . . That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is
capable of classwide resolution . . . .”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 615
(1997) (noting that the Rule 23 amendments governing class actions emphasize that class
actions should “achieve economies of time, effort, and expense”).
22. Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 614–15.
23. Comcast Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1432; see also Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 350 (holding that
plaintiffs seeking certification under Rule 23 must “affirmatively demonstrate” that the
class complies with the requirements for certification (emphasis added)). Scholars have
also viewed the holding in Wal-Mart as making class certification more difficult to obtain.
See Max Helveston, Promoting Justice Through Public Interest Advocacy in Class Actions,
60 BUFF. L. REV. 749, 750–51 (2012) (“[In Wal-Mart], the Court subjected the proposed
class to an increased level of scrutiny and appears to have raised the bar for all future
groups seeking class certification.”).
24. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (“A court must consider ‘the likely difficulties in
managing a class action,’ but in doing so it must balance countervailing interests to decide
whether a class action ‘is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.’ ” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3))).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CLASS ACTIONS
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, originally
passed in 1938, governs the procedure and administration of class
action suits.25 However, the modern version of the rule developed out
of amendments adopted in 1966.26 The Advisory Committee designed
those amendments to address certain problems that the previous
version of the rule had created. Specifically, the Advisory Committee
sought to eliminate the original rule’s “overly formal” categories for
class actions and to expand the scope of the available types of classes
and claims.27
The amended Rule 23(a) outlines four prerequisites that any
class must meet to be certified: (1) “numerosity” of parties, (2)
commonality of legal or factual issues, (3) typicality of the named
plaintiff’s claim compared to the rest of the class, and (4) adequacy of
the named plaintiff’s representation of the class.28 These prerequisites
apply to every type of class actions that can be brought under Rule
23.29 Rule 23(b)(3) describes the most common type of class action: an
action in which legal or factual questions “predominate” over any
individual questions of law or fact, rendering the class action device
“superior” to other methods of adjudicating the claim fairly and
efficiently.30 Plaintiffs like Mullins often bring small consumer claims
through this type of class action.31
25. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know
Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 405 (2014).
26. See Mullenix, supra note 25, at 405.
27. See Sherman L. Cohn, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J.
1204, 1213–14 (1966). The 1938 version of Rule 23, in relevant part, identifies three
different types of class actions: (1) where plaintiffs wish to litigate a shared claim; (2)
where adjudication of the claims will or may affect specific property involved in the action,
even if the claims are not the same; and (3) where there is common law or fact among
different claims and a common form of relief is sought. See, e.g., John G. Harkins, Jr.,
Federal Rule 23—The Early Years, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 705, 707 (1997). Some courts viewed
these three types as strict classifications for class actions, while other courts expanded the
classifications to achieve pragmatic solutions. See Cohn, supra, at 1214.
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Mullenix, supra note 25, at 425.
29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)–(b). The two other types of class actions, not discussed
in this paper, are found in Rule 23(b)(1) (when separate actions would create
incompatible standards for parties defending a class action, or when the interests of
individuals not parties to the litigation would be affected by the action) and Rule 23(b)(2)
(when plaintiffs seek declaratory or injunctive relief rather than money damages). FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 23.40(1) (3d ed. 2015).
30. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); see also Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest
and Other People’s Money, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 53, 60 (2004) (“Most attempts to certify
cases in federal court now invoke Rule 23(b)(3) . . . .”).
31. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, § 23.21[5][e].
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The requirements for certification in Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3)
demonstrate the Advisory Committee’s effort to ensure that the
amended rule did not sacrifice efficiency or ease of administration in
managing the class action device.32 The Supreme Court has preserved
this emphasis on managing the class action in its decisions addressing
certification of 23(b)(3) class actions. In Amchem Products v.
Windsor,33 the Court wrote that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions balanced
the interests of class members who would not have brought claims on
their own with “systemic efficiency.”34 The Court noted that Rule
23(b)(3) provides a “nonexhaustive” list of factors courts could use to
determine whether the class fails the predominance requirement,
including the potential interest of class members in controlling the
litigation individually and potential difficulties in managing the class
action.35 In Amchem, the Supreme Court denied certification for a
class bringing asbestos-related claims because of the probable
difficulty of managing the wide variety of claims brought by various
class members.36
The Supreme Court recently addressed this issue again in
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,37 finding that a proposed class failed the
predominance requirement for certification under Rule 23(b)(3).38 In
explaining its holding, the Court wrote that Rule 23(b)(3) applied
when a class action is “not as clearly called for,” meaning that the
Court must take a “close look” at whether common questions
predominate to determine whether a class action is appropriate and
manageable.39 This in-depth analysis of proposed class definitions
suggests that classes should be defined narrowly enough to avoid
unwieldy and inefficient class actions.40
These decisions advance a theme in class action jurisprudence:
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions must be efficient and manageable to
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment
(“Subdivision (b)(3) encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve
economies of time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons
similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other
undesirable results.”).
33. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
34. Id. at 615.
35. Id.; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A), (D).
36. See Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 625.
37. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
38. See id. at 1433.
39. Id. at 1432–33.
40. See, e.g., id. at 1432; Elena Kamenir, Comment, Seeking Antitrust Class
Certification: The Role of Individual Damage Calculations in Meeting Class Action
Predominance Requirements, 34 GEO. MASON L. REV. 199, 225 (2015).
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justify litigating claims collectively.41 Many circuit courts recognize an
implied prerequisite for certification that is not found in the text of
Rule 23, requiring that classes must be “ascertainable” or specific
enough to identify who might be a member of the class using
objective criteria.42 Some courts have gone further, adopting a
heightened ascertainability rule requiring both objective evidence and
a “reliable and administratively feasible” method to determine class
membership based on that evidence.43 By focusing on the ease of
determining putative class members, this requirement seeks to ensure
that class actions can be efficiently managed, in keeping with the
Supreme Court’s approach in Amchem and Behrend.44 But some
courts, such as the Seventh Circuit in Mullins, have refused to adopt
the heightened ascertainability requirement, fearing that it might
indiscriminately bar certain claims.45
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF MULLINS V. DIRECT DIGITAL
The plaintiff’s proposed class definition in Mullins v. Direct
Digital, LLC46 gave the Seventh Circuit an opportunity to evaluate
the effect that the heightened ascertainability requirement would
have on a small consumer claim.47 In Mullins, plaintiff Vince Mullins
sued defendant Direct Digital for fraudulently misrepresenting
“Instaflex” as a medicine for joint pain relief, claiming that the
product was little more than a sugar pill.48 Mullins sought to certify a
class of consumers under Rule 23(b)(3),49 defining the class as
41. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, § 23.46[1]–[2][a]; David E. Kouba & Carolyn
A. Pearce, Growing Insistence Among Courts for Ascertainability, LAW360 (July 18, 2014),
http://www.law360.com/articles/558013/growing-insistence-among-courts-forascertainability [http://perma.cc/NT2C-D9QD].
42. See, e.g., In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (citing
Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013)); EQT Prod. Co. v. Adair, 764
F.3d 347, 358 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592–94
(3d Cir. 2012)); Matamoros v. Starbucks Corp., 699 F.3d 129, 139 (1st Cir. 2012); John v.
Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007); In re Initial Pub. Offerings
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2006); 1 WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE &
HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 3:1, 3:3 (5th ed. 2011);
5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, § 23.21[3][a].
43. See supra notes 13–14 and accompanying text.
44. See, e.g., Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013); see also
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. at 1432–33; Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997);
Kouba & Pearce, supra note 41.
45. See Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497, 524–27 (6th Cir. 2015); Mullins
v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 U.S. 1161 (2016).
46. 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015).
47. See id. at 659–72.
48. Id. at 658.
49. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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individuals who purchased Instaflex for personal use before the class
action notice was advertised.50 The trial court granted certification,
finding that the plaintiff’s class met the requirements of Rule 23(a)
and (b)(3).51
On appeal, Direct Digital relied on recent Third Circuit
precedent applying the heightened ascertainability requirement to
argue that Mullins’s class should be denied certification. Under Direct
Digital’s interpretation, Mullins would have been required to show a
“reliable and administratively feasible way” to determine, using
objective evidence, whether a putative class member was truly part of
the class.52 Because Mullins’s putative class members were unlikely to
be able to prove that they purchased Instaflex through objective
evidence like retail records or receipts, Direct Digital argued that the
class definition failed to meet the heightened ascertainability
requirement.53 However, the Seventh Circuit refused to adopt the
heightened ascertainability standard and affirmed certification,54
concluding that Mullins’s class definition met the certification
requirements of Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3).55
In doing so, the Seventh Circuit formulated its own standard,
requiring only that Mullins’s class definition meet the implicit
requirement of “weak” ascertainability recognized in that circuit.56
That weaker standard requires that for certification (1) the class not
be too vaguely defined, (2) the class definition not be based on
subjective criteria, and (3) the class not be defined “in terms of
success on the merits.”57 The court affirmed the district court’s grant
of certification because Mullins’s class met these requirements.58

50. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658.
51. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *5,
*10 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014) (“Plaintiff’s class is ascertainable because it is objectively
contained to all individuals who purchased Instaflex for personal use during the class
period and the class period is finite.”); see also 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, § 1:2
(discussing the prerequisites for class action certification).
52. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661–62.
53. See id. at 661.
54. Id. at 672.
55. Id. at 660–61.
56. The Seventh Circuit does acknowledge an implicit requirement that a class be
clearly defined based on objective criteria, or “ascertainable,” in order for a Rule 23(b)(3)
class to be certified. Id. at 659. It does not, however, recognize the additional element
imposed by the heightened ascertainability requirement: that class members be
determined in a “reliable and administratively feasible way.” Id. at 662.
57. Id. at 659–60. A class definition based on the success of the merits is also called a
“fail-safe class,” where class members are only identifiable if the defendant is liable. Id. at
660. A classic example of a “fail-safe class” is one including all individuals who were
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Specifically, the court emphasized that the class definition
identified a particular group of individuals (“purchasers of
Instaflex”), harmed in a certain way (“defrauded by labels and
marketing
materials”),
during
a
specific
time
period
(“purchased . . . within the applicable statute of limitations of the
respective Class States . . . until the date notice is disseminated”).59
The definition was not based on subjective criteria because it focused
on the class members’ action of purchasing the product and the
defendant’s conduct regarding the labeling and marketing of the
product.60 Nor was the class defined on the success of the merits, such
as by limiting the scope of the class to those who the defendant
defrauded.61 Because the class satisfied both the explicit requirements
of Rule 23(b)(3) and avoided the pitfalls that the Seventh Circuit
recognized as fatal to class certification, the court upheld Mullins’s
class certification and refused to adopt the heightened ascertainability
requirement. In rejecting that rule, the Seventh Circuit highlighted
several concerns that the rule would pose were it to be adopted by the
Supreme Court.62
III. THE CIRCUITS’ ANALYSES OF HEIGHTENED
ASCERTAINABILITY
The Seventh Circuit’s rejection of the heightened ascertainability
requirement focused primarily on the potentially problematic effects
that the rule would have on small consumer claims.63 In this type of
class action, where members are unlikely to be able to show proof of
purchase through records or receipts, imposing such a requirement
would almost always result in a denial of certification.64 Without
objective records, plaintiffs would be hard pressed to develop a
“reliable and administratively feasible” method to prove class
membership.65 In essence, the Seventh Circuit refused to adopt
heightened ascertainability because it “effectively bars low-value
consumer class actions,” at least where putative class members do not
“wrongfully” harmed by the defendant. See Erin L. Geller, Note, The Fail-Safe Class as an
Independent Bar to Class Certification, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769, 2770 (2012).
58. Id. at 660–61.
59. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 660–61; Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155018, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2014).
60. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661.
61. Id. at 660; see 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, at § 23.21[3][c].
62. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661–62.
63. See id. at 662.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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have documentary proof of their membership.66 Without the option of
bringing a class action, those small consumer claims would be too
costly to pursue individually, leaving many potential plaintiffs with no
way to pursue their claims.67
By contrast, courts like the Third Circuit that require heightened
ascertainability reason that the requirement eliminates the
administrative burdens of determining class membership, provides
the best possible notice to absent class members, and ensures that
individuals bound by the judgment are clearly identifiable.68 This
“forward-looking view” of certification focuses on how a court will
manage the class action as it proceeds and whether the class will
actually function as a class.69 By requiring proof that putative class
members can identify themselves through a “reliable and
administratively feasible” method, the heightened ascertainability
requirement seeks to ensure that class actions are manageable
without requiring courts to resort to extensive “mini-trials” to
determine who is a class member.70 Thus, notwithstanding the denial
of certiorari in Mullins, the heightened ascertainability requirement
otherwise appears to satisfy the jurisprudential focus of the Supreme
Court and others on class action manageability and efficiency—an
element the Seventh Circuit’s standard downplays.71
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Mullins that the
various policy rationales supporting the heightened ascertainability
requirement fail to justify its adoption because that requirement
makes it nearly impossible to certify small consumer claims.72 But
while the requirement does preclude certification for claims without
objective evidence of class membership, it does so to prevent
inefficient and unmanageable class action proceedings that would
require defendants to challenge each putative member’s claim
without proof.73 This Part evaluates the Seventh Circuit’s analysis of
how heightened ascertainability works and demonstrates that the
actual effects of heightened ascertainability are necessary to maintain

66. Id.
67. See, e.g., id. at 665; Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.
2004) (“[O]nly a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
68. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2013).
69. See Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015).
70. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 305.
71. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (reasoning that heightened ascertainability wrongly
gives the manageability factor “absolute priority” over other considerations); supra notes
32–40 and accompanying text.
72. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668.
73. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307.
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the important goals of manageability and efficiency in class action
litigation.
A. Administrative Convenience
The ease with which a court can administer a class action has
long been recognized as a crucial concern in certifying a Rule 23(b)(3)
class action.74 The Seventh Circuit began its analysis in Mullins by
recognizing this concern in favor of adopting the heightened
ascertainability requirement—namely that it furthers administrative
convenience in a Rule 23(b)(3) action by ensuring that a class action
is the “superior” method “for fairly and efficiently” addressing the
claims at hand.75 The Third Circuit has said that heightened
ascertainability, because it focuses on accurately and efficiently
identifying class members, “eliminates serious administrative
burdens” that work against the efficiencies required for a Rule
23(b)(3) class action.76
Because the putative class members in Mullins would have no
way to prove that they purchased the product at the certification stage
without extensive fact-finding, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
such a class could not be certified under the heightened
ascertainability requirement due to the “administrative costs and
headaches” that would be required to determine class membership.77
The court reasoned that the requirement forced judges to view
administrative concerns “in a vacuum,” causing them to deny
certification without considering the fact that, despite administrative
concerns, a class action may be the only way for small consumer
claims to be effectively litigated.78 Thus, instead of requiring
heightened ascertainability, the Seventh Circuit maintained that the
explicit efficiency requirement and the manageability factor of Rule
23(b)(3) are sufficient to ensure that a class action is the superior
vehicle for litigating the individual claims.79
74. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 (1997) (“The
development [of class action practice] reflects concerns about the efficient use of court
resources . . . .”).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663 (citing Marcus v. BMW of N.
Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012)).
76. Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012). Whether a
class action is “efficient” includes, in particular, considerations of whether the issue being
litigated is common to all class members, as well as the “likely difficulties” in the
management of a class action. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3)(D); Helveston, supra
note 23, at 759.
77. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663.
78. See id.; supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.
79. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663.
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This fear that courts would deny certification of small consumer
claims due to administrative concerns is not entirely unjustified.
Applying the heightened ascertainability requirement, the Third
Circuit denied certification for a proposed class of small consumer
claims under Rule 23(b)(3), similar to the class proposed in Mullins.80
The plaintiffs in Carrera v. Bayer Corp.81 purchased a diet pill of
dubious effectiveness and were equally unlikely to have proof of
purchase such as product packaging or receipts.82 The Third Circuit
seized on this deficiency, holding that a plaintiff cannot satisfy the
ascertainability requirement if determining membership would
involve “individualized fact-finding or mini-trials.”83 This confirms the
Seventh Circuit’s concern that small consumer class actions like
Mullins or Carrera would fail because of the difficulty of efficiently
determining class membership.84 Furthermore, the outcome in
Carrera is not an isolated incident; many classes have failed the
heightened ascertainability requirement because of a lack of
manageability or administrative feasibility in identifying class
members.85
However, these cases also suggest ways that the plaintiffs can
define their classes in an ascertainable and manageable way—one
that satisfies the heightened ascertainability requirement even in a
class action for small consumer claims.86 Although the Seventh Circuit
80. Compare id. at 658 (proposing a class action against the seller of dietary joint
supplements for allegedly engaging in fraudulent advertising), with Carrera v. Bayer
Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 2013) (proposing a class action against Bayer for
allegedly claiming that a diet pill enhanced metabolism).
81. 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013).
82. Id. at 304.
83. Id. at 304, 307 (quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d
Cir. 2012)).
84. See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664; Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307.
85. See, e.g., Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he District Court properly found that individual inquiries would be required to
determine whether an alleged overbilling constituted unjust enrichment for each class
member. Such specific evidence is incompatible with representative litigation.”);
Sethavanish v. ZonePerfect Nutrition Co., No. 12-2907-SC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18600,
at *17 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2014) (“Plaintiff has yet to present any method for determining
class membership, let alone an administratively feasible method.”). But see Byrd v.
Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 170 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The Byrds’ proposed method to ascertain
[class members] is neither administratively infeasible nor a violation of Defendants’ due
process rights.”).
86. See, e.g., Sethavanish, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18600, at *17 (“[I]n some cases,
retailer or banking records may make it economically and administratively feasible to
determine who is in (and who is out) of a putative class.”); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage
Corp., 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79647, at *41 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010)
(“Plaintiffs offer no basis to find that putative class members will have retained a receipt,
bottle label, or any other concrete documentation of their purchases of Snapple beverages
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feared that the heightened ascertainability requirement will cause
courts to “err systematically against certification,” the rule is not as
harsh as the Seventh Circuit indicated.87 Although Mullins did not
present any receipts or records during the certification process,88 a
plaintiff providing such objective evidence ensures that determining
class membership will not require individualized fact finding for each
putative class member, and the class definition can meet the
heightened ascertainability rule.89
But if putative class members cannot provide objective proof of
their claims, a class action can become unwieldy, requiring that
defendants engage in “mini-trials” to challenge each putative class
member’s claim that they belong in the class.90 By requiring putative
members to have some objective evidence proving their membership
at the certification stage, the heightened ascertainability requirement
avoids lengthy and costly litigation that undermines Rule 23(b)(3)’s
efficiency
requirement.91
Consequently,
the
heightened
ascertainability rule, with its focus on administrative convenience in
determining class membership, fits within the Supreme Court’s focus
on manageability as a crucial requirement for certification.92
B.

Unfairness to Absent Class Members

Another consideration in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action proceeding
is the requirement that class members be provided with notice of the
pending class action. Rule 23(c)(2)(B) requires that, for any class
certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must provide to class
members the “best notice that is practicable under the
circumstances,” which allows these class members to avoid being
bound by a final decision in the proceeding if they choose to litigate

bearing the ‘All Natural’ description.”). For further discussion about ways that plaintiffs
might be able to meet the heightened ascertainability standard, see infra Part IV.
87. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 664.
88. See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification,
supra note 4, at 1.
89. Courts have not yet identified a bright-line rule as to what types of objective
evidence meet the heightened ascertainability requirement; however, they have accepted
retailer records, receipts, and government records. See, e.g., Byrd, 784 F.3d at 169 (finding
that the proposed class was ascertainable because there were “objective records” including
government and retailer records that could “readily identify” class members); Xavier v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (“In order for a
proposed class to satisfy the ascertainability requirement, membership must be
determinable from objective, rather than subjective, criteria.”).
90. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 307 (3d Cir. 2013).
91. See id. at 307–08; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
92. See supra notes 32–40 and accompanying text.
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the claim individually.93 According to the Seventh Circuit, a central
premise of the heightened ascertainability requirement is that all class
members must be readily identifiable so that they will receive actual
and personal notice of the class action—ensuring that they can opt
out.94
Assuming as the Seventh Circuit did that there were no records
or proofs of purchase to show who was a member of the class defined
in Mullins, there would be no way to provide actual notice to each
individual putative class member because the parties could not
identify their names and contact information. If heightened
ascertainability requires actual notice, then Mullins (and other
proposed classes where potential members may lack records to prove
their membership) would fail the heightened ascertainability
requirement, and the court would deny certification.95
This actual notice requirement does not flow from Rule
23(c)(2)(B), which mandates that courts provide the “best notice that
is practicable under the circumstances” and only requires individual
notice for members who can be identified through reasonable
efforts.96 The Seventh Circuit noted that some class members may be
impossible to identify, which is why the Rule does not generally
require actual notice.97 By linking certification to actual notice and
requiring the class representative to contact each and every possible
member of a proposed class, the heightened ascertainability
requirement would create a very high bar for small consumer claims.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit feared that strict adherence to the

93. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B); see 3 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, at §§ 8:5,
9:39.
94. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir. 2015) (“If the
identities of absent class members cannot be ascertained, the argument goes, it is unfair to
bind them by the judicial proceeding. A central premise of this argument is that class
members must receive actual notice of the class action so that they do not lose their optout rights.” (internal citations omitted)), cert. denied 136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016). While Rule
23(c) requires that notice be provided to all class members in a Rule 23(b)(3) action, it
does not require actual notice to each individual class member. FED. R. CIV. P.
23(c)(2)(B).
95. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (“[Rule 23] recognizes it might be impossible to
identify some class members for purposes of actual notice.”).
96. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
97. See, e.g., Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665; Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L.
REV. 356, 396 (1967) (“In particular cases it may be practicable to give notice under (c)(2)
which will reach each member of the class. That will not be possible in all cases . . . .”).
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requirement’s actual notice requirement would render such class
actions impossible to certify.98
But heightened ascertainability does not insist on actual notice.
The Third Circuit has emphasized that the heightened ascertainability
requirement facilitates, rather than ignores, the “best notice
practicable” requirement under Rule 23(c)(2)(B).99 For example, in a
case involving a Rule 23(b)(3) class action against a cell phone
provider, the Third Circuit wrote that “[w]here names and addresses
of members of the class are easily ascertainable, . . . due process would
dictate
that
the
‘best
notice
practicable
under
the
100
circumstances . . . would be individual notice.’ ” In the absence of
records to facilitate member identification, individual notice is not
always required because it may not provide the best notice under the
circumstances. When class members are asked to provide receipts to
prove their membership, it may be impossible to identify members
before production of those receipts. Therefore, the “best notice
practicable” in such a situation may be to post a sign in the retailer’s
store.101
Furthermore, even if only a few class members choose to opt
out,102 the heightened ascertainability requirement maintains this
fundamental right of class action litigation while balancing the need
to facilitate the best possible notice to class members.103 Rather than
denying certification if every class member cannot be provided
personal notice, requiring objective evidence to prove class
membership preserves members’ opt-out rights by identifying as
many members as possible. Thus, a lower burden to provide notice to
each individual class member outweighs the higher evidentiary
burden placed on proving class membership because it maximizes the
number of class members who can be reasonably notified. The
heightened ascertainability requirement efficiently and accurately
98. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 665 (“When it comes to protecting the interests of absent class
members, courts should not let the perfect become the enemy of the good.”).
99. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.222 (2004)).
100. Larson v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 687 F.3d 109, 126 (3d Cir. 2012) (alteration in
original) (quoting Greenfield v. Village Indus., 483 F.2d 824, 832 (3d Cir. 1973)).
101. See 5 MOORE ET AL., supra note 29, § 23.102[3].
102. See Francis E. McGovern, Second-Generation Dispute System Design Issues in
Managing Settlements, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53, 61 (2008) (discussing a case in
which only 15.65% of actual class members elected to opt out of the class action upon
receipt of notice).
103. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) (holding that due
process requires that an absent class member be provided with the opportunity to opt out
of a class action); Marcus, 687 F.3d at 593.
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facilitates the notice requirement, while preserving the right of
individuals to opt out of the class action.
C.

Unfairness to Defendants and to Bona Fide Class Members

Finally, the Seventh Circuit addressed the argument that the
heightened ascertainability requirement ensures that bona fide class
members’ recovery will not be diluted by false or inaccurate claims.104
Courts applying the heightened ascertainability requirement have
expressed concern that, in cases like Mullins where there is no
objective evidence, class membership determination would amount to
little more than accepting each putative member’s “say-so.”105 In the
absence of objective evidence, class members may have to rely on
more subjective methods of identification such as affidavits to prove
their membership.106 But, as the Third Circuit noted, affidavits
present problems for both defendants and for bona fide class
members.107 Forcing defendants to simply accept affidavits as proof of
class membership, without any kind of verification, would not be
“proper or just.”108 Furthermore, the use of affidavits without further
verification could result in the submission of fraudulent or erroneous
claims that would dilute the pro rata share of any recovery for bona
fide class members.109
Consequently, courts that have adopted heightened
ascertainability require that when class members use affidavits to
prove membership those affidavits must be verified in some way to
ensure that there are no fraudulent claims.110 The Third Circuit has
recently explained that a plaintiff should present a model of how to
reliably screen affidavits for honesty and accuracy.111 Another court
has adopted a slightly broader requirement, requiring a “specific
proposal as to how identification via affidavit would successfully
operate . . . .”112 Because a class like the one in Mullins did not show
104. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 666 (7th Cir. 2015), cert denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1161 (2016) (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013)).
105. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594; see also Perez v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 262,
269 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (noting that affidavits are “uncorroborated and self-serving
evidence”).
106. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594.
107. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310 (3d Cir. 2013).
108. See Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (quoting Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F.
Supp. 2d 1075, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2011)).
109. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310.
110. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 948–49 (11th Cir. 2015);
Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311.
111. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311–12.
112. Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 949.
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any records or documents to prove class membership, the plaintiff
would have to present some kind of successful model for screening
those affidavits.113
The Seventh Circuit took issue with this approach to affidavits,
finding that it renders them “insufficient as a matter of law” because
of the challenges of demonstrating a successful model for screening
affidavits that is unique to each case.114 The court held that, as long as
defendants have a chance at the claims administration phase to
challenge the validity of each affidavit, they have not been denied due
process.115 The court also noted two problems with denying
certification based on an assumed risk of dilution. First, there is no
“empirical evidence” to suggest that there would be enough
fraudulent or erroneous claims of membership to have an effect on
bona fide class members’ recovery—especially because so few class
members claim recovery at all in a class action.116 Second, using
affidavits may be the only way that individuals with real claims can
prove membership in a class.117 If courts denied certification based on
a fear that using only affidavits as evidence of class membership
would allow fraudulent claims and dilute recovery, then class
members with valid claims but no objective evidence could recover
nothing at all.118
There is little evidence suggesting a high risk of fraudulent claims
diluting recovery, especially because so few class members submit
claims to recover at all.119 This may apply to class actions like Mullins,
in which the class is pursuing a consumer fraud claim and is asking for
the defendant to refund the cost of every problematic product sold

113. A successful model for screening affidavits must reliably determine the veracity of
the affidavits and must be specific enough to allow the defendant to challenge how the
model attempts to determine veracity. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311–12. However, courts
have not yet approved a model that meets these requirements, making it difficult to
determine exactly what such a successful model might look like. See infra note 127 and
accompanying text.
114. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 668–69 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 1161 (2016).
115. Id. at 669 (noting that a defendant does not have a “due process right to a costeffective procedure for challenging every individual claim to class membership”).
116. See id. at 667 (citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015)
(Rendell, J., concurring)).
117. See id. at 668–69.
118. Id. at 668 (“To deny class certification based on fear of dilution would in effect
deprive bona fide class members of any recovery as a means to ensure they do not recover
too little.”).
119. See McGovern, supra note 102, at 128 (noting a case in which the response rate for
claims in a class action was 0.45% in the first six months).
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and to pay appropriate fines.120 If damages (excluding fines) will be
determined by the number of refunds to be issued, a handful of
fraudulent or erroneous claims are unlikely to significantly dilute the
recovery of bona fide class members.121
But this is not the case for every class action or every class action
involving small consumer claims. For example, in Marcus v. BMW of
North America,122 the class sued BMW for tires that “ha[d] gone flat
and been replaced” and for bodily injuries caused by this defect.123
Because these claims required proof that the tire went flat because of
a manufacturer defect rather than some external cause (such as a nail
on the road), BMW could have been forced to pay damages to those
who had submitted fraudulent or erroneous affidavits.124 Moreover,
verifying the cause of each flat tire would involve the exact sort of
“mini-trial” that the heightened ascertainability requirement was
designed to avoid. Although these fraudulent or erroneous claims
would not harm bona fide class members in such a situation, the
claims would certainly harm defendants by forcing them to pay
damages in excess of their liability, which even the Seventh Circuit
noted would violate the defendants’ right to due process.125
Heightened ascertainability undeniably makes it more difficult to
use affidavits as proof of class membership, but the requirement does
not necessarily render affidavits “insufficient as a matter of law.”126
Courts that have applied the heightened ascertainability requirement
to the use of affidavits have consistently held that affidavits can be
used as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate a successful screening
method to weed out fraudulent or erroneous affidavits.127 But those

120. Mullins, 795 F.3d at 670 (observing how most consumer fraud class actions involve
a “common method” for determining damages and how other methods can determine
damages in the aggregate); see also Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 309 (3d Cir.
2013) (“Carrera argues that he can prove at trial that Bayer owes a refund for every
purchase of WeightSmart.”).
121. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 666–69.
122. 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012).
123. Id. at 590.
124. See id. at 603–04 (discussing how damages determined by the cost of replacing
each flat tire is dependent on what caused each tire to go flat).
125. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 672.
126. See id. at 668–69.
127. See Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 07 Civ. 8742 (DLC), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 79647, at *17–18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2010) (“At the class certification stage,
plaintiffs may demonstrate that these elements are susceptible to generalized proof by
disclosing a suitable methodology. When plaintiffs attempt such a showing, however, they
must demonstrate that the proposed methodology can be applied class-wide and ‘that they
could, at trial, marshal facts sufficient to permit them to rely upon’ the proposed
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courts have not yet approved a successful model or given an example
of what a successful model might look like.128 Thus, while it remains
unclear what models would pass muster under heightened
ascertainability, these cases do not render affidavits per se
inadmissible.
Nonetheless, in some types of class action claims it is important
to screen out fraudulent or erroneous affidavits to prevent defendants
from paying more than they owe and to promote a more manageable
process for identifying class members by reducing the number of
putative class members a defendant must challenge.129 In this sense,
the heightened ascertainability rule’s
emphasis
on an
“administratively feasible” model to screen out false or erroneous
affidavits serves a critical role by ensuring that defendants can
efficiently and effectively challenge class membership and limit their
liability to bona fide class members. The Supreme Court has written
that without specificity in the class definition a defendant does not
know how to properly defend the case.130 The heightened
ascertainability requirement creates that specificity so that defendants
can efficiently exercise their right to challenge proof of class
membership and limit their damages.131
IV. HANDLING THE EFFECTS OF THE HEIGHTENED
ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT
Although the heightened ascertainability requirement supports
Rule 23(b)(3)’s intended purpose of balancing the efficiency of class
methodology.” (citations omitted) (quoting McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d
215, 229 (2d Cir. 2008))).
128. See, e.g., Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 949 (11th Cir. 2015)
(“Because Karhu had not himself proposed an affidavit-based method, he necessarily had
not established how the potential problems with such a method would be avoided.
Without a specific proposal as to how identification via affidavit would
successfully operate, the district court had no basis to accept the method.”); Carrera v.
Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2013) (remanding the case to allow plaintiff to
propose a successful model without stating what that model should look like).
129. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 672; cf. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433
(2013) (holding that any model supporting a plaintiff’s damages must be consistent with its
liability case, or “[q]uestions of individual damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm
questions common to the class”).
130. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160–61 (1982) (citing Johnson v.
Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125–27 (5th Cir. 1969) (Godbold, J.,
concurring)).
131. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 309; see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 360–67
(2011) (stating that the defendant had a right to individualized determinations of class
members’ right to employee back-pay and that defendant could assert individualized
defenses accordingly).
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actions, it still likely prevents certification for claims like that in
Mullins. Due to the lack of objective evidence in that case, such as
receipts, labels, or retailer records proving purchase of Instaflex, the
class cannot meet the heightened ascertainability rule’s requirement
that putative class members have objective proof of their
membership.132
The heightened ascertainability requirement was designed to
improve the efficiency of class actions for small consumer claims, as
well as to allow defendants to challenge potentially fraudulent claims
made by individual class members.133 Some have argued that the
requirement’s emphasis on objective evidence creates the unfair
result of keeping some valid claims out of court.134 However, the
Mullins court itself recognized that only a “tiny fraction” of putative
class members file claims, valid or not, to recover the small amount of
damages they can expect from these small consumer claims.135 With so
few putative class members pursuing claims in the first place, even if
the heightened ascertainability requirement bars classes like that of
Mullins from certification, it will only affect a few potential claimants.
Moreover, the limited case law suggests possible workarounds
for the few class members with valid small consumer claims who
intend to participate in the class action. A concurring opinion from
the Eleventh Circuit suggests that affidavits might at least
approximate objective evidence for certain small consumer claims
involving readily identifiable products.136 Additionally, the Third
Circuit’s opinion in Carrera left the door open for a possible, if not
yet discernable, way to prove that a model for screening affidavits
would be successful.137 The court suggests that proof of the model’s
success might serve as sufficiently objective evidence that could

132. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 661 (reasoning that it is unlikely that customers would
have kept their receipts in this inexpensive transaction).
133. See supra Sections III.A, III.C.
134. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial Hostility to
Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 312–13, 330 (2009)
(“[T]he ascertainability requirement readily sacrifices both deterrence and compensation
in favor of an alternative value, namely, ensuring that compensation does not flow to
uninjured parties.”).
135. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 668; see also Geoffrey M. Wyatt, 7th Circ. Stands Out on
Ascertainability of Class Actions, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles
/710549/7th-circ-stands-out-on-ascertainability-of-class-actions [http://perma.cc/9RF5-N8S6].
136. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 952–53 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin,
J., concurring).
137. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2013); supra note 126–28
and accompanying text.
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satisfy the heightened ascertainability requirement.138 These
approaches suggest that, at least under particular circumstances, there
may be ways for putative class members with small consumer claims
to meet the heightened ascertainability requirement despite the
outcome in Mullins.
A. Limited Use of Affidavits
Courts that have adopted the heightened ascertainability
requirement emphasize that affidavits alone are insufficient to meet
the requirement of objective proof of class membership.139 If a
plaintiff with a small consumer claim would have difficulty recalling
the details of when she purchased the product in question, or even
were she to purchase the exact product, an affidavit would be an
unreliable evidentiary source.140 Since affidavits in such cases are
often based on individuals’ subjective memories,141 these courts are
unwilling to consider them as the kind of objective evidence that
prevents the filing of false claims and allows defendants to challenge
individual class membership.142
However, in a recent concurring opinion, Judge Beverly B.
Martin of the Eleventh Circuit suggests one possible way to use
affidavits under the heightened ascertainability requirement.143 When
the value of the claims is low and individuals can easily determine for
themselves if there are potential class members, affidavits alone might
meet the heightened ascertainability requirement.144 Where the
potential recovery is small, unscrupulous would-be class members are
less likely to file a fraudulent affidavit because the risk of perjury

138. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311.
139. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 948–49; Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 153–54, 170 (3d
Cir. 2015); Carrera, 727 F.3d at 309–10.
140. See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 309 & n.5 (noting that the named plaintiff in the case
could not remember when he purchased the product in question and confused the product
with similar products on the market).
141. See Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1090 (N.D. Cal. 2011)
(stating that an affidavit swearing to a class member’s smoking history was inherently
subjective because it was based on an estimate of cigarettes smoked over a certain time
period).
142. See, e.g., Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 594 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting
that affidavits force defendants to rely on absent persons’ declarations as true).
143. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 952–53.
144. Id. Individuals may have a difficult time determining whether or not they
purchased a product when “a challenged product is similar to other unchallenged products
on the market[.]” Id. at 953.
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outweighs the potential reward.145 Furthermore, defendants might be
able to more readily defend against the validity of individual claims
that use affidavits as evidence if the defendants can question the
putative class member about a specific and easily identifiable
product.146 And because so few putative class members are likely to
file claims, the defendants could do so without sacrificing the
efficiency of the class action proceeding because they would have to
defend fewer claims.147 Under these circumstances, affidavits may
approximate objective evidence because some of the subjectivity
concerns about a class member’s memories are removed when
defendants can challenge the individual’s memory about a specific
product.148
While the limited use of affidavits may help some small
consumer claims meet the requirements of heightened
ascertainability, they would be ineffective in cases such as Mullins.
There are a variety of Instaflex-brand pills on the market,149 and it is
possible that putative class members may not know which pills they
purchased. This fact suggests that the claims themselves may be weak
and that administering a class action suit would be costly and
ultimately ineffective.150 When class members are unable to recall
whether they purchased the product in question, let alone provide
proof of purchase, they probably cannot prove their claims in court at
all—whether litigating in a class action or individually.151
145. See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 667 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136
S. Ct. 1161 (2016) (citing Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 175 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell,
J., concurring)).
146. See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 309 (3d Cir. 2013) (stating that
defendants cannot challenge affidavits in instances where the putative class members
cannot accurately recall their relevant purchases); cf. Marcus, 687 F.3d at 594 (“Forcing
BMW and Bridgestone to accept as true absent persons’ declarations that they are
members of the class, without further indicia of reliability, would have serious due process
implications.” (emphasis added)); Godec v. Bayer Corp., No. 1:10-CV-224, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 131198, at *23 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2011) (noting that defendants can present
defenses against individual claimants).
147. See Wyatt, supra note 135.
148. See Karhu, 621 F. App’x at 953.
149. See INSTAFLEX, supra note 1 (listing a variety of Instaflex products, including
Instaflex Joint Support, Instaflex Advanced, and Instaflex Bone Support).
150. See Randolph v. J.M. Smucker Co., 303 F.R.D. 679, 687 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (noting
that because there were so many different types of Crisco oil on the market, the plaintiffs
might have difficulty determining which type they purchased, creating “substantial
difficulties” for the administration of the class action).
151. See Kouba & Pearce, supra note 41 (“If an individual is not a class member, that
person cannot rely [on] any common findings of liability or share in any judgment in favor
of the class. Thus, without proof that they are a class member, a claimant cannot prove
that defendant is liable to him or her.”).
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However, one can easily envision a class action involving
consumer claims about a unique but relatively inexpensive product.152
Under different facts, certain small consumer claims may not be
completely barred from certification if they can use affidavits in a way
that closely approximates objective evidence like receipts or records.
B.

Proving the Reliability of Affidavit Screening Models

Although the Third Circuit has refused to permit the use of
unverified affidavits in heightened ascertainability cases, the court
nonetheless indicated one way that putative class members might use
affidavits to prove class membership. In Carrera, the Third Circuit
rejected the plaintiff’s proposal of a method to screen the accuracy
and truthfulness of affidavits on the basis that there was no proof of
the proposed method’s reliability or effectiveness.153 The court
remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to submit a specific screening
model and to show how the model could reliably determine the
veracity of the affidavits in question.154 These requirements would
ensure that defendants have the opportunity to challenge the validity
of the screening model of the affidavits, rather than engaging in
“mini-trials” about the validity of each individual affidavit.155 They
would also prevent defendants from having to face “satellite
litigation” about who is bound by the final judgment when the class
was not sufficiently definite.156 Finally, these requirements would
prevent fraudulent or erroneous claims from diluting bona fide class
members’ recovery, so that those members will not receive less than
they deserve.157 Essentially, clear evidence of a successful model for
screening affidavits might be sufficiently objective to satisfy the
heightened ascertainability requirement.158

152. One example might be a unique food product like the Kinder Surprise Egg, which
is inexpensive but poses a possible choking hazard because, while the hollow egg is made
of chocolate, within it is a plastic container with a toy inside (although this particular
product is banned in the United States). See Kathleen Caulderwood, Kinder Surprise
Chocolate Eggs Brought into Corporate Battles, Gun Debates, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 10,
2014, 6:53 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/kinder-surprise-chocolate-eggs-brought-corporate
-battles-gun-debates-1597618 [http://perma.cc/TWU4-XZAZ].
153. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 311 (3d Cir. 2013).
154. Id.
155. See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 2012).
156. Id. at 593 (citing 1 RUBENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 42, § 3:1).
157. Carrera, 727 F.3d at 310.
158. Cf. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 173 (3d Cir. 2015) (Rendell, J., concurring)
(“We have precluded class certification unless there can be objective proof—beyond mere
affidavits—that someone is actually a class member.”).
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But the court’s opinion provided no indication about what a
successful model might look like.159 Plaintiffs apparently would have
to demonstrate the model “in action” at the certification stage, which
may create a challenging evidentiary burden.160 Without such a
demonstration of the model, the opinion expresses doubt that a
screening model could satisfy the heightened ascertainability
requirement.161 The court notes that the proof of the model’s success
must be more than “mere assurances” that the model will work.162
Furthermore, such a model must be specific to the case in question,
rather than a general model that does not screen for the particular
facts or legal theories of the case.163
Although Carrera has ostensibly described a way that affidavits
can be used in small consumer claims, it remains to be seen what a
successful screening model would look like. However, assuming that a
plaintiff can demonstrate a successful model to a court that has
adopted the heightened ascertainability requirement, Carrera at least
obliquely suggests a way that small consumer claims lacking other
objective evidence like receipts or records can still meet the
requirement.
The discussed proposal may provide an answer as to how some
small consumer claims can be successfully adjudicated as class actions
under the heightened ascertainability requirement. Classes like the
one in Mullins may generally be barred under the requirement due to
their lack of objective evidence and the difficulty of identifying
whether putative class members purchased the product in question.
However, the heightened ascertainability requirement may allow for
some flexibility for certain small consumer claims involving low-cost,
unique products or claims that can demonstrate a successful affidavit
screening model.

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

See Carrera, 727 F.3d at 311.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 311–12.
See id. at 311.
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CONCLUSION
Although the Seventh Circuit insisted that heightened
ascertainability has the “effect of barring class actions,” especially in
cases involving small consumer claims,164 the Third’s Circuit’s
application of heightened ascertainability suggests that there may be
more room for successful small consumer claims.165 Nonetheless,
heightened ascertainability makes it more difficult for small consumer
claims to be certified as class actions.
If the Supreme Court reaches this issue and adopts the
heightened ascertainability requirement, it would likely do so because
the Rule 23(b)(3) focuses on the efficiency and manageability of class
actions—a central concern in class certification.166 But in order to
prevent heightened ascertainability from keeping classes like that of
Mullins from being certified, the Court should also consider the types
of evidence that classes may use to prove certification under the
heightened ascertainability requirement. In the absence of accessible
records or individual proof of purchase, this may mean permitting
disinterested third-party affidavits, defendant cross-examination of
randomly selected affiant class members, or affidavits alone in cases
where the value of the claims are low and individuals can easily
identify themselves as class members.167
Considering such evidence allows claims without documentary
evidence to proceed, while ensuring that the “proposed class will
actually function as a class.”168 But regardless of the evidence the
Court may permit in class certification, the heightened
ascertainability requirement remains a valuable tool for securing the
efficiency and manageability of class actions in cases involving small
consumer claims. By requiring putative class members to somehow
prove their membership at the certification stage, the heightened

164. Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 658 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S.
Ct. 1161 (2016).
165. See supra Parts I–II.
166. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (“A court must consider ‘the likely difficulties in
managing a class action,’ but in doing so it must balance countervailing interests to decide
whether a class action ‘is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.’ ” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(d))); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“Subdivision (b)(3)
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense . . . .”).
167. See Karhu v. Vital Pharm., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, J.,
concurring).
168. Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015).
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ascertainability rule ensures that small consumer claims comply with
one of Rule 23(b)(3)’s most important purposes: to “achieve
economics of time, effort, and expense” through class actions.169
SARAH R. CANSLER**
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